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BUDGETARY DYNAMICS IN THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN ISRAEL1 
GUY NAVON2 
This study examines the short-run effects and dynamics of exogenous shocks 
to the regular budgets of the local authorities in Israel with emphasis on the 
reduction in government participation and taking into account the 
heterogeneity of the local authorities. To accomplish this, the study uses a 
panel of 193 local authorities for the years 1996–2002 and estimates a 
dynamic model for the components of the regular budget. This makes it 
possible to examine the dynamics of fiscal adjustment in response to changes 
in the size of the deficit and in the components of the budget. The changes in 
revenue from municipal taxes and other independent revenues, expenditure 
and participation and equalization grants were estimated by means of a Vector 
Error Correction model. The main findings are as follows: (a) Exogenous 
changes in the components of the budget, such as a reduction in government 
grants, affect the level of the per capita deficit in the short run but following 
that the deficit converges to its original level. (b) A reduction in government 
grants leads to an immediate cutback in services to residents and increased 
deficits. (c) The process of adjustment in the non-Jewish local authorities is 
twice as long as that in the Jewish ones. Therefore, the reduction in grants 
leads to an increase in deficits for a longer period in non-Jewish local 
authorities. (d) The process of budgetary adjustment differs among local 
authorities according to socioeconomic ranking. The weakest local authorities 
(clusters 1-3) and the strongest local authorities (clusters 8-10) respond to a 
change in the deficit primarily by reducing labor costs while the development 
town local authorities cut back their services to residents.    
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The local authorities account for a significant proportion of the general government’s 
activity and exhibit a high degree of heterogeneity in the structure of their economic 
activity. The goal of this study is to examine the dynamics of fiscal adjustment in the local 
authorities’ budgets to exogenous shocks. This is particularly relevant in view of the 
reduction in government funding of the local authorities’ budgets during the years 2002–04 
 
1 Thanks to Lior Gallo and Sagi Dagan for their help in gathering and processing the data and to the 
participants in a seminar given by the Research Department of the Bank of Israel for their helpful 
comments.  
2 Bank of Israel, Research Department.  
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which led to a serious deterioration in the services provided by many local authorities and 
in some cases led to liquidity problems and an inability to meet current obligations for an 
extended period of time. The cutback in government grants primarily affected local 
authorities whose populations have a low socioeconomic ranking.3 This was in contrast to 
the long-run improvement in the local authorities’ fiscal management which led to a halt in 
the growth of their debt to the banks in the mid-90s. This was accomplished without any 
increase in government transfers relative to the local authorities’ activity. This 
improvement was to a large extent the result of the more efficient enforcement of financial 
reporting requirements which began with the publishing of audited financial reports for the 
local authorities. It was also due to the tighter budget constraints placed by the government 
on decision makers in the local authorities (following the Suari Commission of 1993) and 
the increased ability of voters to assess the financial management of their local authority 
(Diskin, 1999; Brender, 2003). These processes, along with the recovery plans implemented 
in many of the local authorities, transformed the local authorities from a sector that 
increased the government deficit each year to one that makes only a marginal contribution 
to the deficit (although there remain a number of local authorities whose management is 
problematic).  
The sharp reduction in equalization grants and in the government funding of the local 
authorities’ budgets can be viewed as an experiment and provides us with the opportunity 
to test the reaction of the local authorities to exogenous shocks while taking into account 
the heterogeneity of the sector. To this end, the study uses panel data on 193 local 
authorities4 for the period 1996–2002 prior to the reduction in  grants. The unique feature of 
this study is the use of panel data and the simultaneous and dynamic estimation of the 
regular budget.5 The proposed behavioral model makes it possible to forecast the budget 
dynamics created as a result of shocks to the various budget components, such as cuts in 
government grants. The Vector Error Correction (VEC) method was chosen to estimate the 
budget dynamics. As part of the VEC model, a Granger causality analysis was performed 
for changes in independent revenues, government transfer payments to the local authorities, 
municipal expenditure and the cost of debt service. The model is similar to Vector Auto 
Regression (VAR) which was first applied by Dahlberg and Johansson (1998, 2000) and by 
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1989). In the VEC model, in contrast to VAR, the estimated vector also 
includes the deficit which makes it possible to differentiate between short- and long-run 
effects. Since the estimated budget components are determined simultaneously, a system of 
equations was estimated that explains the short- and long-run dynamics of the regular 
 
3 For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see the 2003 Report of the Research Department, Bank of 
Israel, pp. 192–196.  
4 During the period of the sample, there were 210 local authorities in Israel. Jerusalem was not included 
in the panel due to its special characteristics and neither were small local authorities for which data was not 
accessible.  
5 The budgets of the local authorities are divided into two main types: the regular budget, which is 
designated for the financing of current activity, and the development budget. This study is concerned with 
short-run dynamics and therefore concentrates on the activity financed by the regular budget and ignores the 
development budget. The financial data for the regular budget include data on the composition of 
expenditure, revenue, grants and the deficit.  
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budget components, including independent revenue per resident, grants per resident and 
expenditure per resident. The model assumes that the local authorities affect their budgets 
through non-negligible fixed effects. The variation in the budget response is dependent on 
the physical characteristics of the local authorities, as well as on their budgetary 
characteristics. The use of this method makes it possible to isolate the effects of the various 
groups of local authorities. In the second stage of the study, use is made of the VEC model 
in order to detect differences between the budget dynamics of the Jewish and Arab local 
authorities and between socioeconomic clusters of local authorities.  
This study follows previous ones which examined the relationship between budget 
components and a local authority’s characteristics. Using cross-section samples, previous 
studies found strong causal relationships between a number of fiscal variables though they 
used models for estimation that ignore intertemporal dynamics (Ben-Ali, 1999; Razin, 
1998, 1999 and 2002). These studies found that there are economies of scale in budget 
management whereby the larger local authorities benefit more from budget stability than 
smaller ones. An additional advantage they identified is the existence of a possible 
correlation between a local authority’s socioeconomic ranking and the exploitation of 
independent revenue potential. Razin (2002) showed that local authorities with a high 
socioeconomic ranking rely less on the participation of the government (i.e. government 
grants account for a lower proportion of their total revenue). An additional finding of these 
studies is that socioeconomic ranking is positively correlated with a local authority’s per 
capita expenditure, its per capita revenue and the per capita size of the grants and loans it 
receives. The issue of the local authorities’ deficits is more complex than simply the 
question of which factors influence revenues and expenditures since the size of the deficit is 
also dependent on the unquantifiable characteristics of each local authority, such as the 
quality of its management. Nevertheless, we can expect budget changes to be correlated 
with changes in the size of the deficit.  
The article is divided as follows: Section 2 describes the equation for the local 
authorities’ sources and uses. Section 3 presents the possible causal relations between the 
components of the budget. Section 4 outlines the empirical framework for the estimation of 
the budgetary dynamics of changes in the size of the deficit and the budget components. 
Section 5 describes the database. Section 6 presents the estimation results. Section 7 
presents conclusions drawn from the estimation of the model. The appendices present the 
detailed estimation results and a description of the variables and their treatment.  
 
 
2. THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES’ BUDGETS 
 
The local authorities, like the government, manage their budgets on a cash basis while the 
Auditing Branch of the Ministry of the Interior publishes the local authorities’ audited 
financial reports on a uniform accounting basis. Thus, the deficit that the mayor relates to is 
calculated on a cash basis and does not include special loans and grants on the revenue side 
nor the debt that is to be redeemed on the expenditure side. This deficit is smaller and more 
stable over time. The increased involvement of the Ministry of Finance, beginning in the 
mid-90s, and the expanded auditing of the local authorities by the Ministry of the Interior 
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led to the publishing of audited financial reports on a uniform and comparable basis. The 
accounting budget lines, as they appear in the published reports, include repayments of 
loans and therefore do not reflect the local authority’s economic activity or the behavioral 
mechanism of its decision makers.  
The expenditures of the local authorities are divided between two types of services: 
public services such as education and welfare and municipal services such as cleaning and 
sanitation, water, sewage and urban planning. The expenditure on services includes 
municipal and public services (education and welfare) and is broken down into expenditure 
lines for salaries and expenditure lines for activity. Some of the local authorities outsource 
their municipal services (water, sewage and garbage collection) through independent 
municipal corporations while the rest provide these services themselves. For the purposes 
of this study, expenditures on the water and sewage system were combined as part of the 
local authority’s activity, even for local authorities that purchase water services from an 
outside party. An additional component of a local authority’s expenditure is the financing 
of the deficit and the redemption of debt.  
The sources available to the local authority (for current uses and the provision of 
services but not for development needs) can be divided into independent revenues, revenue 
from government participation in the financing of public services that are mandated by law, 
designated grants and other revenues (donations, revenues from joint projects with other 
local authorities and funding from public institutions).  
The independent revenues of the local authority are defined as funds that are collected 
directly from the residents and businesses within the jurisdiction of the local authority. 
Independent revenues come from four sources: 1) arnona (municipal taxes on residences 
and businesses); 2) fees for municipal services; 3) revenues from various bylaws, fees and 
levies; and 4) fees for the use of municipal property. Arnona is the main source of a local 
authority’s independent revenues.  
The participation grants are transferred directly from the budgets of various government 
ministries (primarily from the Ministry of Welfare and the Ministry of Education) to the 
local authorities for the purpose of providing public services that are mandated by law or as 
general financing. Participation grants are also provided by the Ministry of the Interior (to 
finance firefighting services, for example), the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of 
Absorption, the Ministry of Defense, etc. The proportion of these transfers within a local 
authority’s budget is relatively small and is generally related to programs that are dependent 
on unique local characteristics. The size of the participation grants is calculated according 
to tables which are decided on by each ministry and are available to the public. Appendix 1 
describes the participation grants from the various ministries in greater detail. 
  
 
3. ESTIMATION 
 
An analysis of the fiscal dynamics of the local authorities and their reaction to exogenous 
shocks requires a long-run view and the use of a panel in order to control for the fixed 
effects that influence the activity of the local authority and which vary with a local 
authority’s location, its unobservable characteristics, etc. These fixed factors are liable to 
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affect the budget components in different ways but it can be assumed that there are links 
between these components since they are determined simultaneously. The empirical method 
chosen to estimate the behavioral equations of the local authority’s decision makers is the 
Vector Error Correction (VEC) model as presented by Bohn (1991) and applied for the first 
time by Buettner and Wildasin (2002). Buettner and Wildasin analyzed the variation in the 
deficits of local authorities in the US. The model is similar to a constrained Vector Auto 
Regression (VAR) model; however, unlike VAR, the VEC model is appropriate for 
variables that are non-stationary but are linked through a long-run cointegrative relation and 
therefore the model allows for dynamics between the endogenous variables.  
The model assumes that the per capita economic deficit is sustainable6 and that the local 
authorities face an inelastic intertemporal budget constraint. This specification makes it 
possible to differentiate between short-run and long-run relations. As part of the VEC 
model, a Granger causality analysis was carried out on tax collection, government transfer 
payments to the local authorities, revenue and expenditure. This framework makes it 
possible to obtain a broad perspective on the short- and long-run relations between the 
budget variables and local authority characteristics. It should be remembered that the 
estimated equations are not based on a structural/behavioral model of the local authorities 
but rather represent a reduced form for the fiscal adjustment of the various budget variables 
to budgetary changes which is similar to the behavioral model of Dahlberg and Johansson 
(2000).  
 
3.1 The model 
 
In contrast to the budget of the national government, a significant proportion of the funds 
available to local authorities is provided by unilateral government transfers to fund the cost 
of municipal activity7 and from designated equalization grants. For many local authorities, 
particularly weak ones, these grants are essential for balancing the budget and therefore 
revenues are broken down into independent revenues and revenue from grants. The budget 
for local authority i in year t is therefore dependent on its revenues and expenditures and 
can be written as follows:  
 
     )1( tititititi GRDSED ,,,,, −−+=  
 
where the deficit is dependent on a number of endogenous variables: (1) the local 
authority’s salary expenses (Et); (2) the cost of servicing the debt (DSt) – the redemption of 
loans and other financing expenses; (3) independent revenues (Rt) – revenues from arnona 
and other independent revenues from education and welfare; and (4) government transfers 
(Gt) – equalization grants and participation grants for municipal activity in education and 
welfare. The components of revenue, i.e. (3) and (4), can be divided into free revenues 
(arnona and equalization grants) and revenues from activity. The free revenues can be 
divided into arnona (R_arnona) and revenues from education and welfare services 
(R_other). In the same way the revenue from grants can be divided into equalization grants 
 
6 That is, the local authority is able to finance the deficit over the long run.  
7 For further details on participation and equalization grants, see Appendix 1.  
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(G_izun) and participation grants (G_partic) which are paid to the local authority in order to 
finance specific expenses. Similarly, expenditure can be divided into salary expenditure 
(E_wage) and expenditure on activity (E_activ) although, in contrast to the breakdown of 
revenue components, this breakdown is not as precise since the provision of services by the 
local authority necessitates the payment of salaries to the workers involved.  
Most of the current deficit, as it appears in the audited financial reports, is composed of 
the costs of loan redemption while it is the economic deficit8— calculated on a cash basis—
that the local authority’s decision makers take into consideration. Therefore, the estimated 
model uses the deficit on a cash basis rather than the budget deficit. This deficit is 
composed of the accounting deficit minus the redemption of loans and plus transfers from 
the regular budget. Thus, equation (1) can be rewritten as follows:  
 
     )2( titititi GREED ,,,, −−=  
 
where EDt is the economic deficit and where financing expenditures from the debt service 
budget line have been added to expenditure. The VEC model is one of the accepted 
methods of estimating budgetary adjustments in response to shocks and the causality 
between the various budget lines. The rationale for this model is that if local authorities, on 
average, maintain budget discipline in order to remain within the intertemporal budget 
constraint, the components of the budget will be linked through a cointegrative relationship 
and in the long run the deficit will be sustainable (Holtz-Eakin, 1989; Bohn, 1991). Since 
the number of residents in a local authority changes over time and these changes are 
unrelated to the intertemporal budget constraint, equation (2) needs to be normalized for the 
number of residents within the local authority’s jurisdiction.  
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The econometric theory behind the VEC model assumes that the deficit is stationary 
(since it is sustainable) and that the changes in the budget components (the dependent 
variables) can be the result of lagged changes in the various budget components, the size of 
the deficit and other exogenous variables. Thus, the behavioral equation describing the 
budget dynamics between the endogenous components can be described using a 
simultaneous system of behavioral equations (Model 1): 
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8 See Section 4 for a more detailed explanation of the difference between the economic and budgetary 
deficits.  
BUDGETARY DYNAMICS IN THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN ISRAEL 25
Each of the simultaneous equations appearing in Model 1 is explained by two lags of 
the endogenous variables and the lagged economic deficit (EDt), as well as a vector of 
exogenous control variables (Zt): the average wage per salaried position among the 
residents of the local authority (wage) as an indicator of the local authority’s socioeconomic 
situation; the dependency ratio9 (tlut_ratio) as a demographic control variable; the 
government deficit as a percentage of GDP (gov_def) which acts as a control variable for 
the government’s economic situation; and a dummy variable for 1998 which was an 
election year in most of the local authorities (elections_98). The dummy variable receives a 
value of 1 in the year 1998 for local authorities in which elections were held and 0 for all 
other years and for local authorities that did not hold elections in 1998.  
The model allows for correlation between the residuals of the estimated equations. The 
equations, which are estimated by the addition of lags of the other dependent variables, 
make it possible to test for Granger causality between the variables. The model is estimated 
using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method where θj (the coefficients 
of the deficit in each of the equations) are the Error Correction (EC) coefficients.  
It can be seen that the EC variables of revenue and expenditure will have opposite signs 
( ,0ˆ  ,  0ˆ 31 <> θθ ) in order that the long-run stationarity conditions be fulfilled. The 
estimated equations in the model do not directly control for the existence of fixed effects 
for each local authority; however, on the assumption that these effects do not change over 
time, estimation of an equation of differences of the VEC type solves the problem and 
makes it possible to test the differences in budgetary dynamics between groups of local 
authorities. In order to control for the differences in characteristics between the local 
authorities (religion and socioeconomic ranking) the model must be estimated for each 
group separately.  
 
 
4. THE DATA 
 
The research uses panel data on local authorities for the years 1996–2002. Seventeen of the 
210 local authorities were omitted due to lack of data.10 Since the panel has only 7 years of 
data, conclusions cannot be drawn regarding long-run budget dynamics but it is possible to 
analyze the short-run effects of fiscal shocks.  
The final sample included 193 local authorities. A breakdown by dominant religion 
shows that 121 of them have Jewish majorities (17 of which have mixed populations) and 
the rest have non-Jewish majorities. The division according to socioeconomic ranking for 
2001 shows that 66 of the local authorities are within ranking 1-3, 57 are within ranking 4-
5, 34 are within ranking 6-7 and the remaining 36 are within the highest ranking of 8-10. 
The sample includes financial data from the audited financial reports and data on the 
physical characteristics of the local authorities. The data was obtained from the Branch for 
Auditing of Local Authorities and from publications of the Central Bureau of Statistics. The 
 
9 The ratio between residents who are not of working age (0-14, 65+) and those who are (16-64).  
10 The Central Bureau of Statistics does not publish population statistics for local authorities whose 
population is less than 5,000.  
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data are normalized according to number of residents, unless otherwise noted, in order to 
take into account the variation in population among the local authorities. The treatment of 
the dependent variables is explained in Appendix 2. 
Table 1, which presents the variables used in the estimation, shows that the local 
authorities in the sample are relatively large ones with an average population of 36 
thousand as compared to 27 thousand for all local authorities during the period 1996–2002. 
This is due to the fact that the Central Bureau of Statistics does not publish data on the 
population breakdown of local authorities with less than 5,000 residents. The data in the 
table also show that 55 percent of the local authorities’ revenue is from grants with only the 
remaining 45 percent from independent revenue. The proportion of equalization grants 
within total grants is an average of 54 percent for the sample. The average deficit of the 
local authorities in the sample is 5.2 percent. Another interesting feature of the data is the 
very large standard deviation for most of the variables which is an indication of the high 
level of variation among the local authorities.  
 
Table 1 
Main Variables, 1996 to 2002 (NIS per resident, in 2002 prices) 
 
 
Variable 
 
Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
Residents (thousands) 33.8 51.8 
Dependency ratio (percentage) 63.8 31.9 
Proportion of jobseekers 3.9 1.3 
The average wage per salaried employee – males 6,692 2,250 
 
Sources 
 
 
 Independent revenues 2,154 1,354 
  of this: Revenue from arnona 1,244 885 
 Grants 2,628 1,317 
  of this: Equalization grants 1,428 1,067 
Uses   
 Independent expenditures 4,246 1,506 
  of this: Salary expenditure 1,907 620 
Economic deficit 85.7 602.0 
   
4.1 Socioeconomic ranking 
 
As part of an analysis carried out by the Central Bureau of Statistics11, which was published 
in January 2004, the local authorities were ranked according to the socioeconomic level of 
their populations in 2001. The ranking was done on the basis of demographic variables, 
 
11 “Characterization of the Local authorities and their Ranking according to their Population’s 
Socioeconomic Status in 2001”, January 27, 2004. http://www.cbs.gov.il/hodaot2004/13_04_22.htm 
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standard of living, education, employment and unemployment and pensions. The result is a 
ranking of local authorities into ten clusters. The lowest two clusters contain 41 local 
authorities which are primarily Arab ones and the lowest ranked of those are Bedouin local 
authorities in the Negev. These clusters also include a number of Jewish local authorities 
which contain ultra-Orthodox populations (Beitar Illit, Modiin Illit and Bnei Brak). Only in 
the third cluster are there a number of local authorities which are (still) called development 
towns (Netivot in 60th place and Ophakim in 71st place). The rest of the development towns 
are located in the fifth cluster between the 80th and 110th places. Beyond the 123rd place 
there are no Arab towns. Thus, the top-ranked local authority with a minority population 
(which is a Druse town) is located in the middle of the table. The highest cluster (9-10) is 
made up of Jewish local authorities, most of which are located in the Center of the country. 
Givatayim, whose local authority is in the highest place (193rd), is in the 8th ranking.  
Table 2 shows that the local authorities’ revenues and expenditures are correlated with 
their socioeconomic status. Thus, per capita revenue and expenditure increase with 
socioeconomic ranking. At the same time, per capita government participation in the local 
authorities’ expenses decreases with socioeconomic ranking. The data on socioeconomic 
ranking is only available for the years 1995, 1999 and 2001 and therefore the average wage 
per position among men was used in all the equations in order to control for socioeconomic 
ranking. This variable was found to be correlated with the local authority’s socioeconomic 
ranking (in 1999 the correlation was found to be 0.95) and, in contrast to socioeconomic 
ranking, is available for all years of the sample.  
 
Table 2 
Main Economic Characteristics according to Socioeconomic Status, Average for  
1996-2002 
Source: Audited Financial Reports, Branch for Auditing of the Local Authorities, in NIS according to 2002 prices.  
 
4.2 The local authority’s dominant religion 
 
The distribution of local authorities according to the ranking of the Central Bureau of 
Statistics suggests the hypothesis that there is a significant difference between local 
authorities according to religion. To test this hypothesis, the local authorities were divided 
into two main groups: Jewish and mixed local authorities in one group and the rest in the 
other. The grouping of the local authorities in this manner is meant to take into account the 
significant differences between the two groups. Thus, the minority local authorities are 
located primarily in the periphery which is characterized by a wide dispersion of the 
Cluster 1–3 4–5 6–7 8–10 
Per capita independent revenue 1,007 2,045 2,917 3,705 
 of this: per capita arnona 539 1,257 1,683 2,088 
Per capita grants 2,818 2,934 2,229 2,209 
 of this: Per capita equalization grants 1,564 1,533 1,190 1,265 
Per capita expenditure 3,386 4,485 4,562 5,181 
Per capita economic deficit 65 54 51 202 
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population and problems of accessibility to centers of employment. Indeed, the comparison 
of the main characteristics of the local authorities according to dominant religion (Table 3) 
reveals significant differences in the local authorities’ financial condition. Thus, the Jewish 
local authorities are 3.4 times larger on average than the non-Jewish ones and their per 
capita independent revenue is three times larger (primarily because per capita revenue from 
arnona is much lower in non-Jewish local authorities). Accordingly, per capita expenditure 
in the non-Jewish local authorities is about 30 percent lower than in the Jewish ones. 
Therefore, the non-Jewish local authorities are dependent to a larger extent on government 
grants, particularly the equalization grants, in order to balance their budgets.  
 
4.3 Unit roots in panel data 
 
Estimation of time series requires that the variables be stationary in order for the Gauss-
Markov assumptions to hold. In order to ensure that the estimated coefficients in the model 
are stationary, an Im, Pesaran and Shin test (IPS, 2003) was carried out in order to test for 
unit roots in the panel data. This involves testing for the existence of a unit root in each of 
the local authorities (193 equations for each variable) and then weighting the statistics 
obtained for each local authority into one final statistic. The reason for choosing the IPS test 
rather an alternative one, such as the one suggested by Leven, Lin and Chu (LLC, 2002) or 
the Breitung-Meyer test (BM, 1994), is that the alternative tests assume that all the local 
authorities have the same unit root. The IPS, in contrast, is free of that assumption and allows 
for each local authority to have a different root. This is accomplished by applying an 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to each local authority separately. 
 
Table 3 
Main Characteristics According to Dominant Religion Average for 1996-2002 
 
Source: Audited Financial Reports, Branch for Auditing of the Local Authorities; NIS in 2002 prices.  
*   The financial data is per capita in NIS.  
** According to the division into clusters for 2001.  
 
 Jewish Local 
Authorities 
Non-Jewish Local 
Authorities 
Number of residents (thousands) 34.4 10.2 
Socioeconomic cluster (median)** 6 3 
Average wage per salaried position 7,671 5,867 
   
Independent revenues 2,876 939 
 of this: Revenue from arnona 1,686 496 
Grants 2,541 2,793 
 of this: Equalization grants 1,352 1,571 
Expenditures 4,786 3,364 
Deficit 636 368 
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Table 4 presents the statistics for the IPS test: once for the levels of the budgetary 
variables and once for the first differences where the null hypothesis is the existence of a unit 
root. Because of the small number of years for which data is available, the test was carried out 
with one lag. As expected, independent revenues and expenditures were only stationary 
after taking differences while the government grants and economic deficit were stationary 
without taking differences (at a 5% level of significance). A possible explanation of these 
results is that per capita independent revenues and expenditures are dependent on the 
residents’ standard of living which has increased over time (including the sample period).  
 
Table 4 
The Im, Pesaran and Shin Test for Unit Roots in Panel Data12 
 
Variable13 W-Statistics 
R Per capita independent revenue -0.82 
G Per capita government grants -3.43* 
E Per capita expenditure -1.26 
R∆  ∆ (Per capita independent revenue) -33.16* 
G∆  ∆ (Per capita government grants) -10.29* 
E∆  ∆  (Per capita expenditure) -4.53* 
ED Per capita economic deficit -7.68* 
 
In contrast, the economic deficit is restricted to a low level due to long-run budget 
constraints and therefore is stationary. These results provide support for performing the 
estimation of the budgetary variables using differences. 
 
 
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS  
 
As mentioned earlier, the estimation of the model creates a large number of estimated 
parameters since the set of equations includes a number of simultaneous difference 
equations. We will first present the results of the test for the optimal number of lags in the 
basic model (Equation 4) in which total independent revenue, total grants and total 
expenditure are dependent on their own lagged values and on the level of the economic 
deficit. In the second stage, estimation results are presented for the various categories of 
local authorities (Table 5) and finally an analysis of causality is presented.  
 Although the testing of budgetary dynamics in the relatively short run (1996–2002) is 
problematic, the large number of cross-section dimensions, i.e. the large number of local 
authorities, enables us to test whether the estimates are consistent. The estimation of the 
VEC model (Equation 4) requires testing for the optimal number of lags. Since the data is 
 
12 An asterisk indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis at a level of 5% according to Im et al. (1997, 
Table 2). One lag.  
13 All the variables are expressed in 2002 prices. 
ISRAEL ECONOMIC REVIEW 30
Table 5 
Stages of Estimation 
 
Model Specification 
 
Model 1 
Estimation of the basic model (Equation 4) for independent revenues, grants and 
expenditure. 
  
 
 
 
Model 2 
Model 1 + separation between revenue from arnona and other independent revenues, 
between the equalization grants and participation grants and between expenditure on 
salaries and expenditure on activity.  
  
Model 3 Model 2 + interactive variables for non-Jewish local authorities 
  
Model 4 Model 3 + interactive variables for the clusters 
 
annual and there are only a few years in the sample, the model was first estimated as an 
unrestricted model with two annual lags and then used to test for the optimal number of 
lags.14 As can be seen from Table 6, which presents the test statistics for the likelihood ratio 
test of the number of lags estimated in Model 1, the null hypothesis that the second lag is 
not significant cannot be rejected and therefore the model was estimated with two lags. 
Three other criteria that were tested (Schwarz, Akaike and Hannan-Quinn) also supported 
the estimation of a model with two annual lags.  
 
Table 6  
Test for the Optimal Number of Lags15 
Note: log(L) – log of the likelihood, LR – test of the likelihood ratio, AIC – Akaike criterion, SC – Schwarz 
criterion, HQ – Hannan-Quinn criterion.  
* Number of optimal lags. 
 
5.1 Error correction 
 
The physical dynamics of the changes in the level of the deficit are manifested in the error 
correction estimates. This dynamic describes the short-run relation. The model is estimated 
using two different specifications: Model 1 which is the basic model and does not 
 
14 It should be remembered that two differences in the differences equation translate into three annual 
lags.  
15 The unrestricted model is the one with two lags.  
Number of lags Log(L) LR AIC SC HQ 
0 -13347.37 -   56.35  56.42  56.37 
1 -13260.25  172.03  56.05  56.26  56.13 
2 -13176.25  164.45*  55.76*  56.11*  55.90* 
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differentiate between revenue and expenditure components and Model 2 which 
differentiates between revenue from arnona and other independent revenues on the one 
hand and between equalization and participation grants from the various ministries on the 
other. This makes it possible to determine whether there is a difference between the 
adjustment of unrestricted sources, which are unrelated to the actual provision of services, 
and the adjustment of sources that are conditional on the provision of services, as well as 
between the adjustment of expenditure on salaries and that of expenditure on activity.  
Table 7 presents the EC estimates for each of the equations in Model 1 and 2 which 
show that there is convergence to the intertemporal budget constraint in the long run even 
though exogenous shocks that affect the size of the deficit are possible in the short run. In 
the two specifications (Model 1 and 2), the coefficients receive the expected signs: the EC 
coefficients for expenditures are negative and those of independent revenues are positive. It 
was also found that the budgetary adjustment to change in the level of the deficit is carried 
out through changes in expenditure. Thus, an increase in the current deficit leads to a 
reduction in expenditure through a positive and statistically significant effect. The detailed 
 
Table 7 
Error Correction Estimates 
 
Source: Models 1 and 2. Detailed results of the estimation are presented in Appendix 3 and 4. Standard deviations 
appear in parentheses. 
* Significant at a level of 5%.  
Equation Model 1 Model 2 
D(E) -0.128* 
(0.036) 
 
D(E_wage)   -0.029* 
(0.010) 
E_activ(D)  -0.095* 
(0.035) 
D(R) 0.016 
(0.021) 
 
R_arnona(D)  0.004 
(0.019) 
R_other(D)  0.016 
(0.021) 
(G) -0.011 
(0.017) 
 
G_izun(D)  -0.017 
(0.015) 
G_partic(D)  -0.002 
(0.014) 
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model (Model 2) indicates that the dynamic of budgetary adjustment differs between 
components: a shock that increases the deficit will lead to a reduction in expenditure on 
activity and to a lesser reduction in expenditure on salaries. A possible explanation is that 
the local authorities are unable to alter labor agreements and the expenditure on salaries in 
the short run and therefore reduce the level of services they provide to their residents. The 
detailed results of the estimation appear in Appendix 3 and 4.  
 
5.2 The budgetary dynamics in the non-Jewish local authorities 
 
Brender (2005) points out that ethnic diversity negatively affects the level of economic 
activity in local authorities. He claims that one of the main reasons for this is the lack of 
trust between the groups. Brender also shows that the rate of arnona collection in non-
Jewish local authorities is significantly lower than in Jewish ones. Other studies, which 
compare Jewish and non-Jewish local authorities, have demonstrated significant differences 
in their financial situations. Razin (1999) explains the differences as being the result of, 
among other things, the fact that Jewish local authorities are larger than non-Jewish ones (in 
number of residents) and that per capita independent revenues are higher in the Jewish local 
authorities. This hints at a difference in behavior between the local authorities, as well as in 
budgetary dynamics. In view of this, Model 2 was estimated with the addition of interactive 
variables16 (slope dummies) for non-Jewish local authorities. According to this method, the 
interaction between the dummy variables for the non-Jewish local authorities and the 
budget components represents a difference in the speed of fiscal adjustment between Jewish 
and non-Jewish local authorities. This makes it possible to statistically test whether the 
behavior patterns of the two categories of local authorities are the same. Due to the 
relatively small number of observations for non-Jewish local authorities in the sample, no 
differentiation was made between Arab (including Bedouin) local authorities and local 
authorities with a Druse majority. Such a differentiation is in fact desirable since the Druse 
serve in the army and are engaged in Israeli society more than Arab Israelis. Thus, it can be 
assumed that the Druse have more trust in the government and that the budgetary dynamic 
of Druse local authorities differs from that of Arab ones. Such a comparison can be made in 
the future when data becomes available for additional time periods. A t-test which was used 
to determine whether the EC estimates are identical for the two groups showed a significant 
difference (at a level of 5 percent) in the dynamics of the wage expenditure equation 
(t=2.24) and that the dynamics of wages in the non-Jewish local authorities is slower than 
in Jewish ones. Thus, the null hypothesis—that there is no difference between the local 
authorities—can be rejected for the rest of the budget components.  
The EC estimates from Model 3 (Table 8) indicate that indeed the budget dynamic 
differs between Jewish and non-Jewish local authorities: (1) The Jewish local authorities 
carry out a rapid adjustment in the size of the deficit through the adjustment of expenditure 
on salaries and on activity while Arab local authorities carry out the adjustment only 
 
16 A multiplicative of the situation variables and the dummy variable for Arab local authorities. In this 
way, the behavior of the local authorities can be compared according to their characteristics in the same 
estimation.  
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through a change in expenditure on salaries. (2) The speed of adjustment of budget 
components to changes in the economic deficit is slower which is manifested in lower  
 
Table 8 
Error Correlation Estimates according to Religion 
 
Source: Model 3. The regression printouts can be obtained from the author. Standard deviations appear in 
parentheses.  
* Significant at a level of 5%.  
 
estimates (in absolute terms). The standard deviations of the EC coefficients for non-Jewish 
local authorities are lower than for the Jewish ones which may indicate a larger variation 
within the non-Jewish local authorities. The Impulse Response analysis of short-run 
relations between the four endogenous budget components (in which they react to a one-
time unexpected reduction of one standard deviation—165 NIS per capita—in government 
grants) indicates that the reduction of grants to non-Jewish local authorities leads to a 
reduction of expenditure in the subsequent two years and the return of the deficit to its 
stable level. This reduction also leads to the lengthening of the period during which the 
unexpected shock in grants is corrected for, such that over a period of 10 years correction is 
only made for 44 percent of the reduction. This is primarily because the EC coefficient of 
expenditure (which is the primary component of the correction) in the non-Jewish local 
authorities is lower by almost half than in the Jewish local authorities.  
 
 
 
Equation Jewish Local Authorities Non-Jewish Local Authorities 
D(E_wage)   -0.030 * 
(0.010) 
 -0.019 * 
(0.008) 
   
D(E_activ) -0.099 * 
(0.036) 
-0.059 
(0.032) 
   
D(R_arnona) 0.096 
(0.019) 
0.005 
(0.018) 
   
D(R_other) 0.017 
(0.021) 
0.009 
(0.020) 
   
D(G_izun) 0.027 
(0.015) 
0.022 
(0.013) 
   
D(G_partic) 0.004 
(0.014) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
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5.3 Budgetary dynamics according to socioeconomic ranking 
 
One of the claims made during the crisis of the local authorities in 2003, which was partly 
the result of a sharp cutback in equalization and participation grants, was that the reaction 
of a local authority to the budget crisis is dependent on its socioeconomic situation.17 In 
other words, the lower a local authority’s socioeconomic ranking, the more dependent it is 
on external sources, i.e. government grants, in order to finance its expenditure. A cut in 
grants is liable to lead to chronic deficits among weak local authorities while stronger local 
authorities (cluster 8-10) are less dependent on grants and therefore can be expected to 
more easily weather similar shocks. It should be mentioned that in 2001, only 15 of the 210 
local authorities were independent, i.e. did not receive equalization grants, and all of those 
were Jewish and located in the 8-10 cluster. In order to test this claim, and the more general 
hypothesis that budgetary dynamics are dependent on the local authority’s socioeconomic 
ranking, Model 2 was reestimated with the addition of slope dummies for clusters (which 
had been aggregated into main groups). Since the non-Jewish local authorities are located 
in the lowest cluster (rankings 1-4), they were omitted from the estimation. The clusters 
were grouped as follows: (1) Ranking 1-3 which includes the ultra-Orthodox local 
authorities and a number of development towns; (2) Ranking 4-5 which primarily includes 
development towns (Jerusalem is in ranking 4 and not included in the sample); (3) Ranking 
6-7; (4) Ranking 8-10 which includes the strong local authorities in the Center of the 
country as well as well-off local authorities such as Omer and Savion. The estimation of the 
model through the addition of interactive variables (between the dummy variables for 
cluster groups and the EC variables) makes it possible to test, among other things, whether 
the reaction to an impulse differs among the local authorities. The estimated equation 
(Model 4) describes the budgetary dynamics of the local authorities according to the 
breakdown into ultra-Orthodox local authorities, development towns and strong Jewish 
local authorities.  
The results of the estimation of Model 4 (Table 9) show that the reaction to an impulse 
differs significantly between groups. Thus, it was found that ultra-Orthodox local 
authorities (Jews in clusters 1-3) and weak development town local authorities (Jewish 
local authorities in clusters 4-5) react to a deficit increase by adjusting their labor costs and 
by reducing the services to residents while stronger local authorities react only through a 
reduction in services. A comparison between Arab and ultra-Orthodox local authorities 
(Jewish local authorities in clusters 1-3) showed a significant difference in the reactions of 
the government (through the equalization grants) to increased local authority deficits. Thus, 
an increase in the deficit of an Arab local authority leads to an increase in the equalization 
grant which is not the case for an ultra-Orthodox local authority. As a result, the reduction 
in labor costs, through the firing of workers or by delaying the payment of salaries, is more 
pronounced in ultra-Orthodox local authorities.  
 
 
17 For further discussion see the 2003 Report, Bank of Israel, the Research Department, pp. 192-6.  
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Table 9 
Error Correction Estimates according to Cluster for Jewish Local Authorities 
 
Source: Model 4. The detailed results of the regression appear in Appendix 4. Standard deviations appear in 
parentheses.  
* Significant at a 5% level.  
 
5.4 Control variables 
 
The two models estimated (Models 1 and 2) include a vector of control variables (Z) which 
have the function of controlling for the effect of external factors on the budget components 
in the short run. This vector includes: the dependency ratio between residents who are not 
of working age (children aged 0-14 and the elderly aged 65 and over) and residents of 
working age18 (aged 15-64); the average wage per salaried position for residents of the local 
authority; the overall government budget as a percentage of GDP; and a dummy variable 
for the year 1998 (which was an election year in most of the local authorities). As 
mentioned above, the average wage of a salaried position serves as an instrumental variable 
for the socioeconomic index of the local authority (Table 10; Appendix 3, 4 and 5). An 
 
18 In computing the dependency ratio, the proportion of children aged 0-18 can be used instead of 
children aged 0-14; however, the results obtained are similar and therefore the calculation which is accepted 
in the literature was chosen.   
Equation Clusters 
1–3 
Clusters 
4–5 
Clusters 
6–7 
Clusters 
8–10 
D(E_wage) -0.124* 0.143* 0.091 0.068 
  (0.048)  (0.052)  (0.054)  (0.052) 
     
D(E_activ) -0.494* 0.417* 0.496* 0.481* 
  (0.181)  (0.194)  (0.203)  (0.195) 
     
D(R_arnona) 0.025 0.077 -0.148 -0.070 
  (0.103)  (0.111)  (0.116)  (0.111) 
     
D(R_other) 0.046 0.064 0.022 0.081 
  (0.120)  (0.128)  (0.134)  (0.129) 
     
D(G_izun) -0.262* 0.225* 0.336* 0.236* 
  (0.074)  (0.079)  (0.083)  (0.079) 
     
D(G_partic) -0.042 0.010 0.062 0.061 
 (0.066) (0.070) (0.074) (0.071) 
     
Number of local 
authorities in sample 
65 
 
58 
 
34 
 
36 
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increase in the dependency ratio, which reflects an increase in the proportion of residents 
who are not of working age, leads, as expected, to an increase in expenditure (on wages and 
activity) and to an increase in the equalization grants. This result is explained by the fact 
that the increase in the proportion of residents aged 0-14 and/or 65+ in the population leads 
to an increase in the expenditure on education and/or welfare. Furthermore, according to the 
formulas which are used to determine the size of the grants, it also leads to greater 
compensation of the local authority from the government budget. Thus, the compensation 
received by the local authority is less than the increase in expenditure. 
 
Table 10 
Estimates for the Exogenous Variables (Model 2) 
 
 E_wage E_activ R_arnona R_other G_izun G_partic 
D(TLUT_RATIO) * 4.801 * 18.846 -0.912 -3.578 * 6.228  4.123 
D(WAGE) * 0.302 *-0.442  0.079  0.123  0.109 * 0.295 
D(GOV_DEF) *-21.443 *-24.897  2.459  1.193  4.995 *-13.616 
D(ELECTIONS_98) *-43.452 *-287.337  20.948 -31.639 *-158.962 -42.614 
Note: The full results of the estimation are presented in Appendix 4.  
* Significant at a level of 5%. 
 
5.4.1 The overall government deficit 
 
In years during which the government deficit grew, one can expect to see a worsening in 
the financial situation of the local authorities. From the results of the estimation of Model 2, 
it appears that an increase in the deficit has a double effect: in the initial stage: the 
government reduces the participation grants and as a result expenditures on municipal 
services also decline; however, at a later stage the government reacts to the deterioration in 
the local authorities’ fiscal state and increases the equalization grants.  
 
5.4.2 Election years 
 
The estimation of the VEC model, on the assumption that the local authorities face a stable 
intertemporal budget constraint, assumes that an election year will not influence the 
components of the budget in the long run. However, it is certainly reasonable to assume that 
in the short run local authorities will be interested in influencing the voters by increasing 
local expenditure in that year and therefore will not remain within the budget framework. 
On the other hand, during the period under study, a number of mechanisms were put into 
place which created a more rigid budget constraint: (1) In 1993, parts of the report of the 
Suari Committee were implemented, thereby establishing clear criteria for the calculation 
of the equalization grants. The dependency on clear and fixed criteria helped reduce the 
manipulative behavior of the local authorities and the government. (2) During the period 
1997–99, recovery plans were initiated. The innovation in these plans was the increased 
involvement of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Interior in the management 
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of the local authorities for the duration of the plans and the linkage of the payment of grants 
to progress in implementing the plans. As part of the involvement of the government 
ministries in the recovery plans, the local authorities were required to maintain budget 
transparency which was also manifested in the increased scope of the auditing of their 
financial reports. The more rigid budget constraint and the availability of trustworthy data 
on the financial and fiscal situations of the local authorities made it possible for the 
residents to punish mayors for improper management (Brender, 2003). The results of the 
estimation show that the mayors indeed had internalized this fact. Thus, in the election year, 
municipal expenditure declined and the local surplus increased temporarily which 
constituted a clear sign of managerial responsibility.  
 
 
6. CAUSALITY TESTS 
 
This section presents possible theoretical connections between the budget components and 
the results of the relevant empirical tests. It is worth mentioning that the short sample 
makes it difficult to draw conclusions from these tests. The first part will focus on the 
connection between independent revenue and expenditure. The second part will deal with 
the intertemporal relationship between government grants on the one hand and revenue and 
expenditure on the other. The second part is of particular importance in research of this type 
since the model (which is presented below) assumes that the economic deficit is sustainable 
and that only exogenous changes in its components will shift it from a stable situation.  
 
6.1 The connection between independent revenues and expenditure 
 
The political economy literature discusses at length the budgetary connection between 
independent revenue and expenditure. In this context, a number of theoretical claims are 
made regarding the possible causal links between the budget components:  
1. Independent revenue and expenditure are dependent on one another. This hypothesis 
assumes that these two budget components are related to one another and change 
simultaneously. Therefore, Granger causality tests will find a two-way link between 
them. Thus, an increase in independent revenue will lead to an increase in expenditure 
and vice versa. The main theoretical model which can explain this behavior is the 
External Voter model presented in Black (1958).  
2. Expenditure leads independent revenue. This connection is derived from the tax-
smoothing model presented in Barro (1979). If expenditures rise as a result of an 
exogenous shock, the local authority will act to increase its independent revenue. 
According to this hypothesis, the voters can be persuaded of the necessity of increasing 
independent revenue only by an unexpected – and temporary – shock in expenditure. 
However, since the municipal tax mechanism is determined as part of the Arrangements 
Law and not by the local authority itself, it cannot be expected that the increase in 
expenditure will lead to an increase in independent revenue from taxes (arnona) except 
on the margin (for example, by increasing the number of parking tickets).  
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3. Independent revenue leads expenditure. This causal relationship is derived from the 
theory that the local authority maximizes its revenue subject to the constraint that the 
residents react to the increased tax rate by changing their place of residence (Niskanen, 
1971). The solution of the maximization problem determines the level of revenue and 
therefore the level of expenditure as well. On the assumption that the residents have full 
information on the tax rate and that they have mobility, we cannot expect this hypothesis 
to hold. However, since individual mobility is limited as a result of the adjustment of 
property prices to changes in the tax rate, it is possible that this relationship will exist in 
the short run.  
 
 
6.2 The relationship between government grants and the local authority’s independent 
revenue and expenditure 
 
The intertemporal connection between government grants and the local authority’s revenue 
and expenditure has been studied by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1989) though it has still not been 
sufficiently clarified. They examined the relationship between the size of grants and the 
level of expenditure though they did not test the opposite relationship according to which 
the central government can change the size of its grants in reaction to changes in either 
independent revenues or expenditures. For example, per capita grants can be reduced as a 
result of the actions of the local government to reduce its deficit (or to increase its surplus). 
The importance of examining these relationships is related to the fact that the size of the 
grants is not dependent on the local authority’s decision regarding expenditure and revenue 
but rather is determined by uniform objective criteria. There are a number of possible 
hypotheses related to these relationships:  
1. The size of the grants simultaneously determines expenditure and independent 
revenue. According to this hypothesis, an increase in participation grants is expected to 
increase the expenditure on the relevant activity without influencing the rest of the 
revenue sources (since the participation grants are linked to specific activities). In 
contrast, the reaction to an increase of the equalization grants should be identical to the 
reaction to an exogenous growth in revenue, i.e. a reduction in arnona. As a result, local 
authorities with a low socioeconomic ranking will tend to undercollect municipal taxes. 
Thus, the actual tax collection relative to its potential should be lower in weak local 
authorities than in strong ones. However, since the government in general ties the 
equalization grants to recovery plans, we can expect that this relationship will not exist or 
will be a weak one.  
2. The levels of expenditure and independent revenue determine the size of the grants. 
According to this hypothesis, the size of the government grants is dependent on the 
difference between independent revenue and expenditure. A local authority facing a 
shock in expenditure (a sharp increase) or in revenue (a sharp decrease) will be 
compensated with larger grants in order to balance its budget. The problem with this 
hypothesis is that it implies an unstable situation in which the government provides the 
local authorities with a guarantee that reinforces their tendency toward irresponsible 
budget behavior and the reduction of the local tax burden. However, since the 
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government in general also acts strategically, there is reason to believe that this 
connection will be a weak one.  
3. The levels of expenditure and independent revenue and the size of the grants are not 
dependent one on the other. This hypothesis complements the previous two and implies 
that there are situations in which the government does not distribute grants according to 
known criteria and therefore there is a lack of certainty as to the size of the grant a local 
authority will receive. An example is the situation in which the size of the grant is 
determined by, among other things, the overall government budget, which is what 
occurred indirectly in the years 2002 and 2003. No support for this hypothesis can be 
found in the economic literature although, as was explained above, it can be assumed that 
in certain situations there is no direct link between the local authority’s collection of 
municipal taxes and expenditure on the one hand and the actions of the central 
government in setting the size of the grants on the other. Furthermore, as was explained 
in the previous section of the article, the main component of government grants (about 64 
percent in 2002) is the participation of the government in the funding of activity 
(primarily education and welfare). From this we can conclude that in a stable situation, 
the per capita size of the grants will be stationary and the exogenous change in the level 
of independent revenues will not lead to a change in the size of the grants but only to a 
change in the size of the deficit. In contrast, we can expect that a reduction in expenditure 
on activity will lead to a parallel reduction in participation grants.  
In order to analyze the intertemporal relationships between revenue, expenditure and 
grants, a Granger (1969) test was carried out. The statistics for the Granger test are 
presented in Table 10. These intertemporal relations can also be seen in the results of the 
Impulse Response analysis presented in the appendices. The main results of the test are as 
follows: 
a) Expenditure is exogenous to independent revenue but not vice versa: Expenditure 
on salaries leads revenue from arnona and the rest of the independent revenues. This result 
is similar to that of Holtz-Eakin et al. (1989). 
b) An increase in grants leads to an increase in expenditure and vice versa (i.e. an 
increase in expenditure or a reduction in revenue leads to an increase in grants). The 
simultaneous relationship between the two components of the budget provides support for 
the External Voter model according to which an increase in revenue received from the 
central government encourages local expenditure. According to this model, the reaction to 
central government grants is identical to the reaction to an exogenous increase in revenue. 
Therefore, an increase in grants will bring about an increase in expenditure. The importance 
of this result lies in the conclusion that not only an increase in participation grants leads, as 
expected, to an increase in expenditure but also an increase in equalization grants and to an 
even greater extent. This result explains why local authorities with a low socioeconomic 
ranking are characterized by undercollection of local taxes. In other words, the rate of tax 
collection relative to its potential in low-ranked local authorities is lower than in higher-
ranked local authorities. The reverse causality, i.e. that the rate of expenditure determines 
the size of the grants, supports the hypothesis that the size of government grants is 
dependent on the difference between independent revenue from taxes and expenditure. This 
means that the government provides guarantees to the local authorities. Thus, a local 
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authority which faces an expected shock in its expenditures or in its revenues (such as a fall 
in revenue due to a deterioration in the financial situation of its residents) will receive 
higher grants in order to balance its budget. This reinforces the tendency of local authorities 
to behave in an irresponsible manner and to reduce the local tax burden.  
c) Independent revenue from arnona and other independent revenues are 
simultaneously correlated.  This result is explained by the dependence of revenues from 
arnona on the level of economic activity in the local authority which simultaneously affects 
the other per capita independent revenues. 
A particularly interesting result of the Impulse Response (IR) analysis of the short- run 
connections between the endogenous variables relates to the effect of an unexpected 
decrease (or increase) in government grants, as occurred in 2003. Thus, a one-time 
unexpected reduction of one standard deviation (about 203 NIS per capita) in the 
equalization grants leads to a simultaneous increase in participation grants of about 28 
percent of the size of the reduction already during that same period and to an increase in the 
current budgetary deficit by about the remaining 72 percent. This gap is closed by the 
reduction in activity during the subsequent three years and the reduction in wages which 
reaches a maximum four years after the reduction in equalization grants. The one-time 
reduction in grants continues to affect the four budget components for an additional five 
years though the size of the impulse declines from year to year. This is particularly  
 
Table 11 
Granger Causality Tests in the Short Run (Model 2) 
Source: Granger causality test on panel data; from the results of Model 2.  
* Significant at a level of 95%. 
 
interesting since in recent years cuts in the budget have led to reductions in grants to the 
local authorities and have thus contributed to increasing the current deficit. The IR analysis 
of a reduction of one standard deviation (178 NIS per capita) in participation grants leads to 
similar results although the local authorities’ speed of response to the reduction is much 
more rapid. This is apparently because the reduction in participation grants reflects a 
reduction in public services to residents. The IR results are presented in the appendices.  
 
 
The Equation (dependent variables) Explanatory 
Variables E_wage E_activ R_arnona R_other G_izun G_partic 
E_wage  1.39 6.50* 9.18* 17.40* 25.65*  
E_activ 3.80  3.42 1.57 9.15* 0.99 
R_arnona 0.06 1.70 10.92* 1.00 1.70 
R_other 0.90 3.96 10.72*   1.02 0.84 
G_izun 7.20*  1.16 5.50 0.47  23.32*  
G_partic 6.25*  8.44 8.23* 1.78 25.34*  
All of them  
(as a group) 
17.05*  27.32*  37.33*  31.80*  47.79*  79.16*  
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
This study has examined the short-run budgetary dynamics of the local authorities in 
response to changes in the deficit. The motivation for the study lies in the sharp cutback in 
government funding of the local authorities’ expenditures during the period 2002–4 which 
led to a serious deterioration in the situation of many of the local authorities. This was 
accompanied by a reduction in services to residents and, in some local authorities, led to 
liquidity shortages and an inability to meet payments for an extended period. The unique 
contribution of this study is the use of panel data on 193 local authorities for the period 
1996–2002 and the use of macroeconomic magnitudes as explanatory variables. As a result, 
the model is able to simultaneously estimate the dynamics of fiscal adjustment to budgetary 
shocks.  
According to the results of the estimation, Jewish local authorities adjust to a change in 
the size of the deficit by rapidly changing their expenditure on salaries and by cutting back 
the municipal services they provide while Arab local authorities carry out budgetary 
adjustment only through a change in their expenditure on salaries but not through an 
adjustment in their level of activity. An example is the delaying of the payment of salaries 
in the Arab local authorities during the years 2002–4 which followed the reduction in 
government grants. As a result, the duration of fiscal adjustment to changes in the deficit 
takes twice as long in Arab local authorities. It was also found that ultra-Orthodox local 
authorities and strong local authorities react to an increase in the deficit by reducing 
expenditure on salaries without changing the level of services to residents while 
development town local authorities (which are ranked in cluster 4-5) react to a similar 
change by cutting services to residents. The comparison between Arab and ultra-Orthodox 
local authorities (which are ranked in cluster 1-3) shows that there is no significant 
difference in their reaction to a deficit increase. However, a significant difference was 
found in the reactions of the government (via the equalization grants) to increases in the 
local authorities’ deficits. Thus, an increase in the deficits of the Arab local authorities 
leads to an increase in equalization grants while in the case of ultra-Orthodox local 
authorities it does not. As a result, the reduction in expenditure on salaries, either through 
the firing of workers or the delaying of payment of salaries, is more pronounced in ultra-
Orthodox local authorities.  
The results also showed that an election year has no long-run influence on the budget 
components although it is reasonable to assume that in the short run the local authorities are 
interested in influencing voters by increasing municipal expenditure during the election 
year and thus exceeding the budget framework. On the other hand, there have been steps 
taken which have contributed to constraining the manipulative behavior of the local 
authorities and the government in the distribution of grants. These include the introduction 
of mechanisms to reinforce budget constraints, the greater involvement of the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of the Interior in the management of the local authorities and the 
introduction of budgetary transparency. The results of the estimation show that the 
influence of an election year on the budget components is restricted to the reduction of 
expenditure. Mayors are aware of the ability of voters to punish them if they exceed the 
budget framework. The addition of exogenous variables to control for the business cycle 
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and the local authority’s socioeconomic situation show that an improvement in the local 
authorities’ socioeconomic ranking leads to a reduction in equalization grants but does not 
affect the level of per capita independent revenues and per capita expenditure. It was also 
found that the government reacts to both its own situation and that of the local authorities. 
Thus, during periods in which the overall government deficit is growing, the government 
reduces participation grants, thus leading to a reduction in services to residents. At the same 
time, it partially compensates the local authorities by increasing equalization grants.  
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9. APPENDICES:  
 
APPENDIX 1: GOVERNMENT GRANTS 
 
The participation grants from the Ministry of Education are paid to the formal education 
system based on a calculation of standard costs (rather than actual costs). In addition, the 
Ministry of Education budgets numerous activities in the informal education system 
(primarily sports and youth activities) according to clear-cut criteria. The education grants 
are calculated according to the number of classes and the number of schools and are 
intended to meet the needs of municipal education in the areas of school security, financing 
of the general pedagogic administration, organized transportation of students and the 
State’s part in financing elementary and high school education. The ranking of per capita 
education grants according to geographic location (district) shows that the grants are 
highest in Judea and Samaria followed by grants to local authorities in the periphery. In 
contrast, local authorities in the Tel Aviv and Haifa districts receive particularly small per 
capita grants. The reason for this disparity is the greater dispersion of the population in 
Judea and Samaria and in the periphery. In addition, the local authorities in the periphery 
are smaller and are compensated for this relative disadvantage through equalization grants.  
The grants from the Ministry of Welfare constitute a payment for welfare services 
which the local authority provides to its residents. The Ministry of Welfare finances about 
75 percent of the cost of welfare services while the local authority covers the remaining 25 
percent. The cost of services is determined by the Ministry of Welfare which defines the 
rules of eligibility, the quotas and the cost prices of welfare institutions. Thus, the rate of 
local participation is in actuality higher than 25 percent. These grants are also based on 
clear and uniform criteria which include the socioeconomic ranking of the local authority, 
income levels, unemployment and demography. In the formula for the distribution of 
grants, weight is given to the local authority’s geographic location according to a map of 
national priorities. Thus, preference is given to National Regions of Priority A and B and to 
local authorities on the Lebanese border.  
In addition to the participation grants, the local authorities receive equalization grants 
and other designated grants which are meant to bridge between the local authority’s 
revenue and expenditure and are calculated according to an allocation formula determined 
by the Ministry of the Interior (“normative expenditures”). The objective of the equalization 
grant is to enable all the local authorities to provide their residents with basis services, some 
of which are mandated by law. In 2002, only 15 of the approximately 266 local authorities 
did not require equalization grants in order to provide their residents with a basic level of 
services. Factors such as the local authority’s socioeconomic situation, the residential 
meterage for arnona, changes in the number of residents and the usage of the grants in the 
previous year are taken into account in determining the size of the equalization grant with 
the goal being to reduce socioeconomic disparity between the local authorities.  
ISRAEL ECONOMIC REVIEW 46
In addition to equalization grants, the government provides other grants to the local 
authorities, such as the “capital grant” to the Jerusalem local authority19 and grants to 
implement recovery programs. These are the only grants that are not linked to a designated 
expenditure. Therefore, government grants can be divided into designated grants which are 
linked to a specific expenditure and general grants to reduce disparity.  
 
APPENDIX 2: VARIABLES 
 
Variable Name Description of the 
Variable 
Explanation and Comments Source of the 
Data 
G Total grants divided by 
number of residents 
In 2002 prices. Ministry of the 
Interior 
G_izun Equalization grants 
divided by number of 
residents 
Equalization grant + 
equalization loan (to finance 
recovery programs). In 2002 
prices. 
Ministry of the 
Interior 
G_partic Rest of grants divided by 
number of residents 
Education and welfare grants 
and other designated grants (to 
finance activity). In 2002 
prices. 
Ministry of the 
Interior 
R Total independent 
revenue divided by 
number of residents. 
In 2002 prices Ministry of the 
Interior 
R_arnona Revenue from arnona 
divided by number of 
residents. 
Net of discounts and returned 
funds. In 2002 prices. 
Ministry of the 
Interior 
R_other Rest of independent 
revenues divided by 
number of residents 
Revenue from education, 
welfare, water distribution and 
other independent revenues. 
Ministry of the 
Interior 
E Total expenditure 
divided by number of 
residents 
Including the purchase of water 
in local authorities with an 
independent water corporation. 
In 2002 prices. 
Ministry of the 
Interior 
E_wage Salary expenditures 
divided by number of 
residents 
Municipal salaries, education 
salaries and welfare salaries. In 
2002 prices. 
Ministry of the 
Interior 
 
19 As already mentioned, Jerusalem is not included in the panel due to its unique characteristics and its 
relative size.  
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Variable Name Description of the 
Variable 
Explanation and Comments Source of the 
Data 
E_activ Rest of the expenditures 
divided by number of 
residents 
Expenditure on municipal 
activity, education, welfare and 
financing costs in the regular 
budget. In 2002 prices.  
Ministry of the 
Interior 
D Budget deficit divided by 
number of residents 
In 2002 prices Ministry of the 
Interior 
ED Current economic deficit 
divided by number of 
residents 
Budget deficit (D) less the 
redemption of loans and the 
relevant transfers from the 
regular budget.  
Ministry of the 
Interior 
Elections_98 Dummy variable for the 
election year.  
Receives a value of 1 in 1998 
and 0 in all other years. 
Ministry of the 
Interior 
POP Number of residents. Number of residents in 
thousands at the end of the 
year.  
Central Bureau 
of Statistics 
Tlut_ratio Dependency ratio The ratio between the working 
age population (15-64) and 
non-working age population (0-
14 and 65+) 
Central Bureau 
of Statistics 
Wage Average monthly wage 
per salaried position 
(males) 
Among residents of the local 
authority. In 2002 prices.  
Central Bureau 
of Statistics 
Gov_def The actual overall 
government deficit 
As a percentage of GDP. Bank of Israel 
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APPENDIX 3: ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR MODEL 1 
 
 D(E) D(R)   D(G) 
D(E(-1)) -0.313  0.012 -0.049 
 
 (0.040)  (0.024)  (0.020) 
D(E(-2)) -0.146  0.097  0.051 
 
 (0.045)  (0.027)  (0.022) 
D(R(-1))  0.092 -0.383 -0.022 
 
 (0.066)  (0.039)  (0.032) 
D(R(-2))  0.016 -0.194 -0.009 
 
 (0.067)  (0.039)  (0.032) 
D(G(-1))  0.283 -0.124 -0.031 
 
 (0.082)  (0.048)  (0.040) 
D(G(-2))  0.237 -0.014  0.048 
 
 (0.070)  (0.041)  (0.034) 
C -314.536  160.766  39.154 
 
 (36.818)  (21.649)  (17.811) 
ED(-1)  0.128 -0.016  0.012 
 
 (0.036)  (0.021)  (0.018) 
D(TLUT_RATIO)  24.526 -3.702  11.007 
 
 (7.837)  (4.608)  (3.791) 
D(WAGE) -0.351  0.181  0.420 
 
 (0.160)  (0.094)  (0.077) 
D(GOV_DEF) -50.467  3.287 -5.938 
 
 (9.308)  (5.473)  (4.503) 
D(ELECTIONS_98) -259.778 -6.020 -209.611 
  (68.581)  (40.325)  (33.177) 
 R-squared  0.231  0.193  0.178 
 F-statistic  17.814  14.184  12.865 
Note: 666 observations following adjustments.  
Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX 4: ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR MODEL 2 
 
 D(E_WAGE) D(E_ACTIV) D(R_ARNONA) D(R_OTHER)  D(G_IZUN) D(G_PARTIC)
C  69.074 -374.746  140.102  22.298 -83.734  137.066 
 
 (10.469)  (35.517)  (19.633)  (21.152)  (14.861)  (13.908) 
ED(-1)  0.030  0.096 -0.005 -0.016  0.018  0.002 
 
 (0.010)  (0.035)  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.014) 
D(TLUT_RATIO)  4.801  18.846 -0.912 -3.578  6.228  4.123 
 
 (2.199)  (7.459)  (4.123)  (4.442)  (3.121)  (2.921) 
D(WAGE)  0.302 -0.442  0.079  0.123  0.109  0.295 
 
 (0.048)  (0.164)  (0.091)  (0.098)  (0.069)  (0.064) 
D(GOV_DEF) -21.443 -24.897  2.459  1.193  4.995 -13.616 
 
 (2.657)  (9.013)  (4.982)  (5.367)  (3.771)  (3.529) 
D(ELECTIONS_98) -43.452 -287.337  20.948 -31.639 -158.962 -42.614 
 
 (20.038)  (67.980)  (37.578)  (40.485)  (28.444)  (26.620) 
Autoregression lags         YES        YES        YES    YES    YES        YES 
 R-squared  0.289  0.226  0.208  0.249  0.175  0.253 
 F-statistic  15.458  11.106  9.997  12.649  8.059  12.939 
Note: 666 observations following adjustments. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX 5: ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR MODEL 4 
 D(E_WAGE)   D(E_OTHER) D(R_ARNONA)    D(R_OTHER) D(G_IZUN) D(G_OTHER) 
C  46.598 -427.396  179.776  4.484 -94.898  112.608 
 
 (13.670)  (51.114)  (29.138)  (33.746)  (20.770)  (18.509) 
ED(-1)  0.124  0.494 -0.025  0.046  0.262  0.042 
 
 (0.048)  (0.181)  (0.103)  (0.120)  (0.074)  (0.066) 
ED_C2(-1) -0.143 -0.417 -0.077 -0.064 -0.225 -0.010 
 
 (0.052)  (0.194)  (0.111)  (0.128)  (0.079)  (0.070) 
ED_C3(-1) -0.091 -0.496  0.148 -0.022 -0.336 -0.062 
 
 (0.054)  (0.203)  (0.116)  (0.134)  (0.083)  (0.074) 
ED_C4(-1) -0.068 -0.481  0.070 -0.081 -0.236 -0.061 
 
 (0.052)  (0.195)  (0.111)  (0.129)  (0.079)  (0.071) 
D(TLUT_RATIO) -9.678  61.296 -1.316 -8.834  14.355 -17.482 
 
 (4.555)  (17.031)  (9.708)  (11.244)  (6.920)  (6.167) 
D(WAGE)  0.281 -0.459  0.139  0.100  0.093  0.199 
 
 (0.057)  (0.214)  (0.122)  (0.142)  (0.087)  (0.078) 
D(GOV_DEF) -21.483 -30.841  10.381  3.333  0.131 -18.479 
 
 (3.346)  (12.510)  (7.131)  (8.259)  (5.083)  (4.530) 
D(ELECTIONS_98) -38.273 -347.410  27.604 -37.330 -177.832  9.130 
 
 (23.531)  (87.987)  (50.158)  (58.090)  (35.753)  (31.861) 
Autoregression lags     YES         YES           YES           YES      YES        YES 
 R-squared  0.342  0.278  0.267  0.261  0.253  0.323 
 F-statistic  10.594  7.854  7.436  7.199  6.900  9.712 
Note: 429 observations following adjustments. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX 6: IMPULSE RESPONSE 
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